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Abstract In the spirit of Searle’s definition of weak and strong artificial intelligence,
this paper presents a discussion on weak computational creativity in swarm intelli-
gence systems. It addresses the concepts of freedom and constraint and their impact
on the creativity of the underlying systems. An analogy is drawn on mapping these
two ‘prerequisites’ of creativity onto the two well-known phases of exploration and
exploitation in swarm intelligence algorithms, followed by the visualisation of the
behaviour of the swarms whose performance are evaluated in the context of argu-
ments presented. The paper also discusses that the strong computational creativity
is presented in ways emphasising that genuine creativity implies ‘genuine under-
standing’ and other cognitive states, along with autonomy – asserting that without
‘Strong Embodiment’, computational systems are not genuinely autonomous.
1 Introduction
In recent years, studies of the behaviour of social insects (e.g. ants and bees) and
social animals (e.g. birds and fish) have proposed several new metaheuristics for
use in collective intelligence resulting from social interaction.
Among the many works in the fields are research on swarm painting (e.g. [26,
8, 37, 38]), ant colony paintings (e.g. [21, 25, 34]) and other multi-agent systems
(e.g. RenderBots [32] and the particle-based non-evolutionary approach of Loose
and Sketchy Animation [15]).
In most of the swarm-based work mentioned above (e.g. [26, 8, 37, 38, 21]),
the painting process does not re-work an initial drawing, but rather focuses on pre-
senting “random artistic patterns”, somewhere between order and chaos [38]. Other
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classes of research (e.g. by Schlechtweg et al. [32] and Curtis [15]) are based on
reworking an initial drawing. There is a significant number of related papers in the
area of non-photorealistic rendering; particularly, many papers approach drawing
and painting using the optimisation framework (where optimisation and generative
techniques are utilised an artistic context). Furthermore, particles have been used
for stippling and other aesthetic styles in numerous papers. Turk and Bank’s work
[36] is an early example of optimising particle positions to control a stroke-based
rendering. Hertzmann [22] optimised a global function over all strokes using a re-
laxation approach. In one of his works, Collomosse [14] used a global genetic al-
gorithm to define a rendering algorithm. More recently, Zhao et al. [41] deployed
an optimisation-based approach to study the stroke placement problem in painterly
rendering, and presented a solution named stroke processes, which enables intuitive
and interactive customisation of painting styles.
This work is an extension of ideas first presented at the Computing and Philos-
ophy symposium at AISB 2011 [2] and subsequently published in the Cognitive
Computation journal [6]. In the work discussed herein the impact of freedom and
constraint on the concept of ‘creativity’ is discussed, followed by a discussion on
the creativity of swarm intelligence systems. This paper also addresses the thorny
issue of ‘Weak’ verses ‘Strong’ computational creativity.
2 ON ART, FREEDOM AND CREATIVITY
For many years there has been discussions on the relationship between art, creativ-
ity and freedom; a debate elegantly encapsulated in the famous German prose by
Ludwig Hevesi at the entrance of the Secession Building in Vienna:
“Der Zeit ihre Kunst
Der Kunst ihre Freiheit”
That is: “To Time its Art; To Art its Freedom”.
which, centuries after, resonates an earlier observation from Aristotle (384-322
BCE) [18] emphasising the importance of freedom, giving rise to further explo-
ration of areas otherwise left untouched (here, having “a tincture of madness”) in
presenting a creative act.
“There was never a genius without a tincture of madness.”
On the other hand Margaret Boden, in [9], more recently argues that creativity
has an ambiguous relationship with freedom:
“A style is a (culturally favoured) space of structural possibilities: not a painting, but a way
of painting. Or a way of sculpting, or of composing fugues .. [] .. It’s partly because of these
[thinking] styles that creativity has an ambiguous relationship with freedom.”
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Considering the many factors constituting the evaluation of what is deemed
‘creative’, raises core issues regarding how humans evaluate creativity; their aes-
thetic capacity and potentially that of other animals (e.g. as exhibited in, say, mate-
selection). Galanter [19] suggests that perhaps the ‘computational equivalent’ of a
bird or an insect (e.g. in evaluating mate selection) is all that is required for [com-
putational] aesthetic evaluation:
“This provides some hope for those who would follow a psychological path to computa-
tional aesthetic evaluation, because creatures with simpler brains than man practice mate
selection.”
In this context, as suggested in [16], the tastes of the individual in male bower-
birds are made visible when they gather collections of bones, glass, pebbles, shells,
fruit, plastic and metal scraps from their environment, and arrange them to attract
females [10]:
“They perform a mating dance within a specially prepared display court. The characteris-
tics of an individual’s dance or artefact display are specific to the species, but also to the
capabilities and, apparently, the tastes of the individual.”
However the question of whether ‘mate selection behaviour in animals implies
making a judgement analogous to aesthetic judgement in humans’ is perhaps (pace
Nagel’s famous discussion ‘What is it like to be a bat? ’[27]) a fundamentally unan-
swerable question.
In contrast, the role of education (or training) in recognising ‘good’ and ‘bad’,
‘creative’ and ‘non-creative’ has been experimentally probed. A suggestive study
investigating this topic by Watanabe [39] gathers a set of children’s paintings, and
then adult humans are asked to label the “good” from the “bad”. Pigeons are then
trained through operant conditioning to only peck at good paintings. After the train-
ing, when pigeons are exposed to a novel set of already judged children’s paintings,
they show their ability in the correct classification of the paintings.
This emphasises the role of learning training and raises the question on whether
humans are fundamentally trained (or “biased”) to distinguish good and/or creative
work.
Another tightly related topic to swarm intelligence in this context is the creativity
of social systems. Bown in [11] indicates that our creative capabilities are contingent
on the objects and infrastructure available to us, which help us achieve individual
goals, in two ways:
“One way to look at this is, as Clark does [13], in terms of the mind being extended to a
distributed system with an embodied brain at the centre, and surrounded by various other
tools, from digits to digital computers. Another way is to step away from the centrality of
human brains altogether and consider social complexes as distributed systems involving
more or less cognitive elements.”
Discussion on creativity and the conditions which make a particular work cre-
ative, have generated heated debate amongst scientists and philosophers for many
years [31]; for a theoretical review on ‘conditions of creativity’; the ‘systems’ view
of creativity; cognitive approaches, etc. see also [35]. Although this article does not
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aim to resolve any of these issues (or even suggest that the presented work strongly
fits and endorses the category of the ‘computationally creative realm’), we investi-
gate the performance of a swarm intelligence sketching system which, we suggest,
highlights core issues inherent in exploring conceptual/artistic space(s).
3 Creativity in Swarms
3.1 Freedom vs. Constraint
Freedom and constraint have been at the core of several definitions for creativity.
Philip Johnson-Laird in his work on freedom and constraint in creativity [23] states:
“... for to be creative is to be free to choose among alternatives .. [] .. for which is not
constrained is not creative.”
In swarm intelligence systems, the two phases of exploration and exploitation
introduce the freedom and control the level of constraint. Pushing the swarms to-
wards exploration, freedom is boosted; and by encouraging exploitation, constraint
is more emphasised. Finding a balance between exploration and exploitation has
been an important theoretical challenge in swarm intelligence research and over the
years many hundreds of different approaches have been deployed by researchers in
this field. In the presented work, two swarm intelligence algorithms are deployed:
the algorithm which is responsible for the “intelligent” tracking of the line drawing
is Particle Swarm Optimisation (PSO) [17, 24]. This well-known algorithm, which
mimics the behaviour of birds flocking, has an internal mechanism of balancing off
the exploitation and exploration phases. However due to the weakness of the explo-
ration in this algorithm, our system also deploys another nature inspired algorithm
to overcome this weakness, Stochastic Diffusion Search (SDS) [1], which mimics
the behaviour of one species of ants (Leptothorax acervorum) foraging. Therefore,
exploration is promoted by utilising the SDS algorithm, whose impact on different
swarm intelligence algorithms has been scientifically reported using various mea-
sures and statistical analysis in several publications (e.g. [7, 3, 5, 4]).
In the visualisation, the swarms are presented with a set of points (which consti-
tute a line drawing – see Fig. 1) and are set to consider these points (one at a time) as
their global optimum. In other words, the global optimum is dynamic, moving from
one position to another and the swarms aim to converge over this dynamic optimum
(Fig. 2).
As stated in the introduction, there have been several relevant attempts to create
creative computer generated artwork using Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Life and
Swarm Intelligence. Irrespective of whether the swarms are considered genuinely
creative or not, their similar individualistic approach is not totally dissimilar to those
of the “elephant artists” [40]:
“After I have handed the loaded paintbrush to [the elephants], they proceed to paint in their
own distinctive style, with delicate strokes or broad ones, gently dabbing the bristles on the
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paper or with a sweeping flourish, vertical lines or arcs and loops, ponderously or rapidly
and so on. No two artists have the same style.”
Similarly if the same line drawing (see Fig. 1) is repeatedly given to the swarms,
the output sketches (e.g. Fig 2) made by the swarms, are never the same (see Fig.
4 to compare different sketches). In other words, even if the swarms process the
same input several times, they will not make two identical sketches; furthermore,
the outputs they produce are not merely randomised variants of the input. In order
to demonstrate this claim qualitatively in an experiment, the output of the swarm-
based system is compared against a simple randomised tracing algorithm, where
each point in the line drawing could be surrounded with lines at a random distance
and direction.
In Fig 3, only PSO algorithm is used to produce the sketch. This experiment is
run in order to highlight the impact of removing exploration (i.e. ‘freedom’) which
is otherwise induced by the SDS algorithm.
3.2 Swarmic Freedom versus Random Freedom
This part presents an experiment with the goal of contrasting the behaviour of the
swarms to that of a group of random agents. In this experiment, the freedom of the
swarm (i.e. Swarmic Freedom) is maintained by the swarm intelligence algorithms
used in the system, whereas the freedom of the agents in the randomised algorithm
is controlled by what we call the Random Freedom. These definitions are utilised
here to highlight the potential of the swarms in exhibiting computational creativity.
The sketches in Fig. 5 (top and middle) show two outputs from a simple ran-
domised algorithm when configured to exhibit limited ‘random’ variations in its
behaviour (i.e. there is only small random distance and direction from the points of
the original line drawing); comparing the two sketches, we note a lack of any signif-
icant difference between them. Furthermore, when more ‘freedom’ is granted to the
randomised algorithm (by increasing the range in the underlying random number
generator, which allows the technique to explore broader areas of the canvas), the
algorithm soon begins to deviate excessively from the original line drawing. For this
reason such randomisation results in a very poor - low fidelity - interpretation of the
original line drawing (Fig. 5-bottom). In contrast, although the agents in the swarms
are free to access any part of the canvas, the swarm-control mechanism (i.e. Swarm
Freedom) naturally enables the system to maintain recognisable fidelity to the orig-
inal input. In the randomised algorithm, contra the swarms system, it can be seen
that simply by giving the agents more randomised behaviour (Random Freedom),
they fail to produce more ‘creative sketches’.
The Swarmic Freedom or ‘controlled freedom’ (or the ‘tincture of madness’) ex-
hibited by the swarm algorithms (induced by the stochastic side of the algorithms)
is crucial to the resultant work and is the reason why having the same line drawing
does not result in the system producing identical sketches. This freedom emerges,
among other influencing factors, from the stochasticity of the SDS algorithm in
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picking agents for communication, as well as choosing agents to diffuse informa-
tion; the tincture of madness in the PSO algorithm is induced via its strategy of
spreading the particles throughout the search space as well as the stochastic ele-
ments in deciding the next move of each particle.
In other words, the reason why the swarm sketches are different from the sim-
ple randomised sketches, is that the underlying PSO flocking component-algorithm
constantly endeavours to accurately trace the input image whilst the SDS foraging
component constantly endeavours to explore the wider canvas (i.e. together the two
swarm mechanisms ensure high-level fidelity to the input without making an ex-
act low-level copy of the original line drawing). Although the algorithms (PSO and
SDS) are nature-inspired, we do not claim that the presented work is an accurate
model of natural systems. Furthermore, whilst designing the algorithm there was
no explicit ‘Hundertwasser-like’ attempt [30] by which we mean the stress on us-
ing curves instead of straight lines, as Hundertwasser considered straight lines not
nature-like and tried not to use straight lines in his works to bias the style of the
system’s sketches.
4 Weak vs. Strong Computational Creativity
Before approaching the topic of weak or strong computational creativity, the dif-
ference between weak and strong AI is highlighted. In strong AI, the claim is that
Fig. 1 This figure shows a
series of points that make
a line drawing; sample line
drawing after one of Picasso’s
sketches.
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Fig. 2 A sketch produced by
the swarms, using both SDS
and PSO algorithms.
Fig. 3 A sketch produced
by the swarms without SDS
exploration.
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Fig. 4 Different sketches of the swarms off a single line drawing.
machines can think and have genuine understanding and other cognitive states (e.g.
“suitably programmed machines will be capable of conscious thought” [12]); weak
AI, in contrast, does not usually go beyond expecting the simulation of human in-
telligence. I.e. instantiating genuine “understanding” is not the primary concern in
weak AI research.
An analogy could be drawn to computational creativity, extending the notion of
weak AI to ‘weak computational creativity’, which does not go beyond exploring
the simulation of human creativity; emphasising that genuine autonomy and genuine
understanding are not the main issues in conceptualising weak computationally cre-
ative systems. Conversely in ‘strong computational creativity’, the expectation is
that the machine should be autonomous, creative, have ‘genuine understanding’ and
other cognitive states.
The concept of ‘Strong AI’ - instantiating a computational machine with genuine
understanding - has provoked many critics, among whom John Searle made perhaps
the most famous attack with his Chinese Room Argument (CRA) [33] (for com-
prehensive discussion see [29]). The central claim of the CRA is that computations
alone cannot in principle give rise to understanding, and that therefore computa-
tional theories of mind cannot fully explain human cognition. More formally, Searle
stated that the CRA was an attempt to prove that syntax (rules for the correct forma-
tion of sentences:programs) is not sufficient for semantics (understanding). Com-
bining this claim with those that programs are formal (syntactical), whereas minds
have semantics, led Searle to conclude that programs are not minds.
But then it is equally clear that Searle accepts that there is no boundary on a
fundamental level to the idea that a machine can think as in Minds, Brains and Pro-
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Fig. 5 The sketches of the swarms with random behaviour: This figure shows the sketches made
with a simple randomised tracing algorithm, using random distance and direction from the lines of
the original line drawing. The first two sketches (top and middle) use the same random distance
(e.g. d) and the bottom sketch uses the random distance of d×6 .
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grams (MBP) Searle [33], in reply to the inquiry ‘Can a machine think?”, expressly
states that the response is clearly ‘yes’, as we are precisely such machines.
Clearly Searle did not intend the CRA to target machine intelligence per se, but
rather any form of artificial intelligence according to which a machine could have
genuine mental states (e.g. understanding Chinese) purely in virtue of executing an
appropriate series of computations: what Searle coined ‘Strong AI’.
Searle contends that understanding, of say a Chinese story, can never emerge
purely as a result of following the procedures prescribed by any machine program,
for in the CRA Searle offers a first-individual story delineating precisely how he
could instantiate such a system, functioning as the Central Processing Unit of a
computer, produce right internal and external state transitions, and even pass a ‘Tur-
ing test’ for comprehension of Chinese, and yet still not comprehend a single word
of Chinese.
In Mind, Brains and Programs, Searle [33] states that in Strong AI “the computer
is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather the appropriately programmed
computer really is a mind, in the sense that, computers given the right programs can
be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states”.
Accordingly, in Strong Computational Creativity, we argue that computer is not
merely a tool in the study of the creativity; rather the appropriately programmed
computer really is creative, in the sense that, computers given the right programs
can be literally said to understand its creation and have other cognitive states (e.g.
teleological and emotive) associated with human creative processes.
In other words, the creative human fundamentally knows that s/he is making
a mark on paper (or a computer screen) or moulding clay or making sound etc.
Whereas merely by following the rules of the program, the computer cannot know
that it is doing anything other than manipulating uninterpreted symbols (or squig-
gles).
We fundamentally suggest that Searle’s famous thought experiment also targets
the analogous notion of ‘strong computational creativity’. I.e. Searle using a simi-
lar “room” could get so good at following the rules that the strings of symbols he
outputs from the room successfully control a ‘Strong’ computationally controlled
creative art-system, producing works judged to have artistic merit by people outside
the room, even though Searle-in-the-room remains ignorant of the produced art and
the externally labelled ‘art practise’. To paraphrase Dennett’s deployment of ‘the
intentional stance’, the computational system is merely instantiating a form of ‘as-if
creativity’ without any real cognitive states, meaning or intentionality. I.e. Any ‘cre-
ativity’ ascribed to the computational system is merely a reflection of the engineer
that designed it and the user who operated it in a given social nexus.
5 The body in question
In our opinion Searle’s Chinese room argument suggests that to take the notion of
‘Strong creativity’ seriously we need to move away from purely computational ex-
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planations of creativity and look at how human meaning and creative processes are
fundamentally grounded in the human body and society; taking the body, issues of
embodiment and our social embedding, much more seriously. And this ‘strong’ no-
tion of embodiment cannot simply be realised by opting a putative computationally
creative system onto a conventional ‘tin can robot’1.
As Nasuto, Bishop et al. [28] a fortiori argue in their discussion of Biologically
controlled animats2 and the so-called ‘Zombie’ animals3 (two examples carefully
chosen to lie at polar ends of the spectrum of possible engineered robotic/cyborg
systems), merely instantiating appropriate sensorimotor coupling is not sufficient to
instantiate meaningful intentional states, as in both cases the induced behavioural
couplings are not the effect of the intrinsic nervous system’s constraints (metabolic
or otherwise) at any level. On the contrary, they are actually the cause of extrin-
sic metabolic demands (made via the experimenter’s externally directed manipu-
lations). Since the experimenter drives the sensorimotor couplings in an arbitrary
way (from the perspective of the intrinsic metabolic needs of animal or its cellular
constituents), the causal relationship between the bodily milieu and the motor ac-
tions and sensory readings can never be genuinely and appropriately coupled. Thus
Nasuto & Bishop [28] assert that only the ‘right type’ and ‘directionality’ of senso-
rimotor couplings can ultimately lead to genuine understanding and intentionality.
For example, considering the case of the optogentically remotely controlled rat,
even though the animal still possesses a fully functional biological body (and, ar-
guably, a functioning brain), the fact that it receives external [optogenetic] com-
mands cannot give rise to a genuine understanding of what the animal is experi-
encing; the rat’s brain receives alien input that, at best, may resemble drug-induced
decontextualised hallucinations – mere uninterpreted symbols/squiggles and squog-
gles – which will remain meaningless despite how accustomed the animal may be-
come to this new mode of remotely induced behaviour. The situation is analogous to
the alien hand syndrome - where in patients, for example, see their arm perform ac-
tions not of their volition or under their control. Such patients never ascribe meaning
as to why their arm acted in this way, albeit they can see (and hence comprehend)
the actions in the same way as any other observer; in this sense they are ‘external
observers’ of their own limb(s) ‘zombie movements’.
In contrast we suggest that fully intentional creative acts, as engaged in the pro-
cess of genuinely understanding the world, require both a fully functional brain and
a fully functional body; so translating the question of the requirements for ‘genuine
creative thinking’ to the defining features of the processes whereby the brain and
body interact with the world and society.
1 Whereby a robot body is imply bolted on to an an appropriate AI and the material of that ‘em-
bodiment’ is effectively unimportant.
2 Robots controlled by a cultured-array of real biological neurons.
3 E.g. An animal whose behaviour is ‘remotely-controlled’, by an external experimenter, say by
optogenetics; see also Gradinaru et al [20], who used optogenetic techniques to stimulate neurons
selectively, inducing motor behaviour without requiring conditioning.
12 Mohammad Majid al-Rifaie and Mark Bishop
In the light of these concerns, until the challenge of the CRA has been fully met,
we urge caution in ascribing ‘Strong’ notions of creativity to any fundamentally
computational system.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed the potential of the swarms in exhibiting ‘weak
computational creativity’. This specific work described herein uses swarm intelli-
gence techniques to explore the difference between using Random Freedom and
Swarmic Freedom in the visualisation of the swarms ‘tracing’ line drawings; this
work highlights the features of swarm-regulated difference versus simple-random
difference in the production of such ‘sketches’ by computer. We stressed on the
significant impact of both freedom and constraint on the emergent creativity, and
presented a discussion on how these two concepts are mapped onto exploration and
exploitation, two of the most infamous phases in the swarm intelligence world.
The ‘weak computationally creative’ artist described herein is the result of merg-
ing two swarm intelligence algorithms, preserving freedom (exploration) and con-
straint (exploitation).
The Strong computational creativity is presented in ways emphasising:
• that genuine creativity implies ‘genuine understanding’ and other cognitive
states.
• autonomy, asserting that without ‘Strong Embodiment’, computational systems
are not genuinely autonomous.
Therefore, we urge caution in ascribing “Strong creativity” to any merely com-
putational system.
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